PAKISTAN AND MILITARY

Date: 1/9/2006

Comment

The military and the birth of Pakistan//// Pakistan celebrates its 50th birthday on Thursday. The political impetus that created Pakistan is wellknown. What is not as wellknown is the military motive for the genesis of an independent Muslim state. //// In determining the British attitude towards the demand for Pakistan, the Muslim element in the British army and the strategic location of the Muslim majority provinces were of considerable importance. //// Brigadier Noor ul Haq appraises the military factor in the making of Pakistan. [Rajiv- Since he is Pakistani, he has few natural biases and White Lies in this article. He has also tried to slip in a few things, that I have pointed out.] The political fabric of the British supremacy in India, in the last resort, rested on the loyalty of the Indian army. All through their stay in India, especially after 1857, the British had been haunted by the fear of another revolt by the Indian army. To prevent this from happening, the British sought to do two things; first, root out community feelings and politics from the armed forces; and secondly, prevent discontentment and alienation in the service. //// As such, the recruitment, organisation, and training of the forces were designed primarily with these objectives in view. Additionally, loyalty was ensured through limiting the strength of the Indian army, supplying them with inferior weaponry and by keeping the officer class an exclusive preserve of the Europeans. //// The Muslims, who were slightly less than 25 per cent of the population of India, were about 40 per cent in the army and thus were given parity with the Hindus, probably for the reason that they had to guard the northwestern frontier of India. But all this was to change with the passage of time. //// The emergence of Indian nationalism led on the one hand to the birth of Hindu revivalism and on the other motivated the Muslims to safeguard their political, economic and cultural interests. The outbreak of World War I, in September 1914, gave a jolt to the British rule in India. The inevitable participation of Indians in the war shattered substantially, though temporarily, some of the British policies laid down for the armed forces. //// Under the stress of the war the British were compelled to agree to the increasing association of Indians in every branch of administration which led to the development of self-governing institutions and the progressive realisation of responsible government in India. This gave the sanction for the Indianisation of the officer cadre in the armed forces. The Indian leadership knew the relative importance of the army in the realisation of self-rule. They, therefore, tried to secure its control partly through the legislative procedure and partly through the process of Indianisation. //// From 1939 onwards, the events in India took a dramatic turn as they were closely linked up with the fortunes of World War II. Early that year, the British decided to modernise the armed forces so as to meet the challenge from the first-rate powers of Europe. Besides, the Indians were called upon to look at the problem of external defence squarely in the face and bear the expenses of the Imperial war through the concept of 'shared responsibility.' //// The Indians were generally satisfied with the prospects of modernisation of the armed forces, though some Hindus were apprehensive of the military training being concentrated in northern India where the Muslim community happened to be strongly represented. //// With the outbreak of the war in September 1939, when the possibility for Indian independence increased somewhat, the British, the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League were forced to reorientate their policies and priorities. The immediate objective of the British was to get the maximum possible Indian support for their war effort. Therefore, they were obliged to look towards the princely states and the Muslims for help. In the process, they suspended the scheme of an Indian federation and promised to modify the Government of India Act 1935 once the war was over. //// On its part, the Congress supported the idea of an all-India federation in order to obtain control of the armed forces through their dominance in the legislature. Therefore, it demanded that defence should not be kept as a reserve subject but instead be handed over to a federal ministry. Precisely for this reason, it wanted that the representatives of the princely states in the Indian legislative assembly should be chosen through election and not by nomination. //// At the same time, it tried to prevent the Muslim League from assuming the role of being the 'sole effective representative of Muslims' and when it failed, the Congress ministries in the provinces resigned as a tactical move to put pressure on the government. But this had no effect on the government because it did not seriously mar the Indian war effort which was colossal. Apart from the monetary contribution, the recruits to the army were coming forth in large numbers. //// The Muslim League, conscious of the Muslims's majority in he strategic areas of the Northwest and the Northeast and their relative strength in the armed forces, began to assert its long cherished desire of an independent and sovereign Muslim state or states in India. The proposed state(s), as demanded in its resolution of March 24, 1940, were to be established in the Muslim majority areas in the Northwest and the Northeast of India. //// The demand for Pakistan, as the new state was to be called, was bitterly opposed by almost all sections of Hindus, Sikhs, the nationalist Muslims as well as by the British, each for different reasons. But this had no effect on the struggle for Pakistan. In August 1940, the British, under the pressure of reverses in the war in Europe, were forced to promise a new constitution after the cessation of hostilities. They also agreed that they would not contemplate any system of government whose authority was directly denied by 'large and powerful elements in India's national life.' //// The later clause was obviously included to satisfy the Muslim community whose contribution to the war effort had been substantial. The offer was rejected by the Congress, but the Muslim League considered it as a 'considerable progressive advance' as it had implied that the new constitution would not be imposed on the Muslims against their will. //// Excerpted from Making of Pakistan: The Military Perspective, by Dr Noor-ul Haq, Reliance Publishing House, 1997, Rs 395, with the publisher's permission. Readers who wish to buy a copy of this book may write to Reliance Publishing House, 3026/7H, Ranjit Nagar, New Delhi 11 00 08. ///// The two 'great evils' -- discontentment and political consciousness which were sought to be avoided by the British -- had crept into the Indian armed forces//// In January 1942, the pressure on Britain increased further. This was mainly due to the Japanese threat from the East and the consequent US intervention in favour of Indian Independence in order to strengthen resistance against Japan . The British were led to realise that: //// any step in the constitutional sphere which would alienate Muslim opinion might have the most serious repercussions on India's war effort whereas active assistance of the Indian National Congress would not make much difference to India's fighting strength though it would be of value internally in such matters as civil defence. //// Under the circumstances, the British officials had to cast a favourable glance at the demand for Pakistan, even though they were not yet prepared to commit themselves on the issue of Pakistan. They accepted in principle that the dissident units could opt out of the federation 'for the time being and possibly altogether.' This, they thought, would meet Jinnah's demand and at the same time induce the Congress to come to terms with the Muslims provinces in order to secure a United India. //// The Cripps Mission was sent to India precisely for this purpose. It, however, failed in its purpose because it did not give the Congress and the Muslim League control of Indian defence, nor did it withdraw the provision of the non-accession for the provinces. Perhaps, deep down, the British government was happy at the Mission's failure because it did not like any fundamental change in the service conditions of the Indian troops which could have an 'unsettling effect' on them while the war was in progress. //// But the result of the Cripps Proposals was that the British, for the first time, accepted the principle of the non-accession of the provinces to the Indian Union, giving the demand for Pakistan a touch of acceptable reality. Naturally, the Muslim League came out much stronger than before, especially in the Punjab and Bengal, giving Jinnah a position of pre-eminence. //// In August 1942, the Congress, dissatisfied by the August offer and the Cripps proposals, decided to exert pressure on the British by launching the Quit India movement. The timing of the movement was obviously designed to take advantage of the war situation. //// Japan, which had already conquered Burma, was expected to invade India soon after the monsoon was over in September 1942. The Quit India movement, however, failed. Its failure brought out the fact that no movement could succeed without the support of the Muslim League and the Muslims. //// During the 1943-45 period, when the fortunes of the war turned in favour of Allied victory, the British began to wriggle out of their previous stance vis-a-vis the Muslims and in favour of a united India. But Jinnah could not be deterred from his demand as he had faith in the inherent strength of the Muslim potential and had realised the importance of the military factor in British decision making. //// Early in 1944, the Congress was also forced to acknowledge the importance of the Muslim League which is evident from the initiatives such as the Gandhi-Jinnah talks. It is another matter that the initiatives did not bear fruit as the Congress was not prepared to accede to the demand for Pakistan. In early 1945, fresh moves were made by the Congress for which the Liaquat-Desai understanding was reached. But the basic problem between them remained unresolved as the Congress leadership was not willing to meet the Muslim League on an equal footing. //// Nevertheless, the British government had been obliged to seek greater association of Indians in the councils of the government. The Muslims came out even better because they received a much greater representation than their numerical strength warranted. Obviously, the war had changed the British attitude in which their concern for possible repercussions in the Muslim Middle East played in important role. They were also not unmindful of the Allied interest in the independence of India. //// This naturally strengthened the determination of the Muslim League to fight for the achievement of Pakistan. But then, towards the end of the war, the British began once more to balance their relations with the Congress when the latter showed its inclination to co-operate with the government. A united India again became a popular theme with the British. //// The result was that when the war came to an end, the Muslim League had to struggle even harder, for the British policy was geared to ensuring a united India. The object of the 1945 Simla Conference was, therefore, to by-pass the Pakistan issue and to get the political parties working together in the central government. But Simla could not kill the Pakistan issue. //// Wavell then decided to expose 'the crudity of Jinnah's ideas' and put the Pakistan scheme to examination with counter proposals. The idea was to discover some alternative to Pakistan and make the Muslim participate in the formation of an Indian constitution. But the result of the elections of 1945-46 demonstrated that an overwhelming majority of Muslims wanted Pakistan. //// The British government, however, remained firm on keeping India united and, in March 1946, a British Cabinet Mission came to India which rejected the case of a 'sovereign' Pakistan. Instead, it recommended a three-tier constitution in which an 'autonomous' Pakistan was proposed. //// Initially, the Muslim League accepted the Plan, perhaps as a stepping stone towards a sovereign Pakistan, but later rejected it because the Congress was not prepared to accept the scheme of the grouping of the provinces as envisaged in the Plan. The Cabinet Mission failed, but the Government of India showed a definite tilt towards the Congress. This led the Muslim League to declare its intention of resorting to 'Direct Action.' //// The British government, in order to share responsibility and keep India integrated, announced the formation of an Interim government consisting of the Congress, the Muslim League, and other minorities. Accordingly, on September 2, 1946, an interim government headed by Nehru was sworn in. //// Some seven weeks later, the Muslim League also joined it. But since the arms and objectives of both the parties were divergent, no working co-operation between them could be established. The Congress members demanded the resignation of the Muslim League members of the government on the grounds that the League's working committee had resolved that it would not join the Constituent Assembly of India. This demand was not acceded to by the British, because they thought it would be 'fatal' for the government to keep the League out. //// But the problem remained unsolved. This led the British government to call a conference of important political leaders in London. Consequently, on December 6, 1946, the British government announced that it would not like to force a constitution upon the unwilling parts of the country which shows that the situation had taken such a turn that they just could not dismiss the case of Pakistan. //// In the ultimate analysis, however, much depended on the attitude of the armed forces. The two 'great evils' -- discontentment and political consciousness which were sought to be avoided by the British government -- had crept into the Indian armed forces. The discontentment was caused due to discriminatory treatment meted out to them in terms of service conditions and resettlement schemes after retirement. //// The induction of the educated element in the forces and the acceleration of the process of Indianisation had made them conscious of rapid political change. There had also been a growing feeling that they were being used as mercenaries. There had been instances of mutinies during the war which show the pressure of discontentment and unrest. //// After the war was over, the hero worship of ex-INA personnel encouraged the troops in believing that mutiny was more rewarding than remaining loyal to the British. The Naval Mutiny in Bombay and Karachi and, later, among the airmen at a number of bases and some elements in the army at Jabalpore were symptomatic of such feelings. The police and the railwaymen also felt the pinch as did the general public which came out into the streets and participated in anti-British riots. //// The revolt of the military could not be allowed to spread and the British quickly reassured them that the subcontinent would be made independent. //// Excerpted from Making of Pakistan: The Military Perspective, by Dr Noor-ul Haq, Reliance Publishing House, 1997, Rs 395, with the publisher's permission. Readers who wish to buy a copy of this book may write to Reliance Publishing House, 3026/7H, Ranjit Nagar, New Delhi 11 00 08. //// The Indian army was designed to be a loyal and a secular force devoid of any political affiliations, but times had changed. The 'virus of communalism' had spread in its ranks When the prospects of Independence became brighter, it appeared to the Muslim League that neither the British nor the Congress would agree to the establishment of an Independent Muslim state. A civil war between the Muslims and the Hindus was a logical corollary which was likely to involve the Indian armed forces. And since the loyalty of the latter could not now be ensured implicitly the British decided to withdraw from India. //// The threatened involvement of Indian troops in Hindu-Muslim fighting made the British even more unsteady and they decided to leave India definitely by June 1948. It was obvious that India could not remain united. It was already writ large in the shape of Hindu-Muslim fighting which had spread all over the country. The use of British troops in the civil war was effective, but the dilemma for the government was that it could not involve them in 'communal' fighting for long or bring adequate reinforcements from home. //// The Indian army was designed to be a loyal and a secular force devoid of any political affiliations, but times had changed. The 'virus of communalism' had spread in its ranks. Some of the members of the armed forces were quick to assure their loyalty to the political leaders of their respective communities. There was also talk of jihad if the Muslim League was ignored or its demand rejected. //// This was certainly going to involve the Muslim tribes of the Northwest India and possibly Afghanistan. In such an eventuality, the Indian armed forces could not be relied upon the their was a chance for the army to split and take sides of their co-religionists. Under these circumstances the British realised that if power was transferred to the Congress by-passing the Muslim League, the 'communal' fighting would be intensified and it would become difficult for the Europeans to extricate themselves from the interior of the country. //// By early 1947, the Pakistan movement had become so strong that it could not be checkmated either by the British or the Hindus. Both of them, therefore, agreed to the division of India. But even after the acceptance the British tried to keep India united in some form. The main reason was that they did not want to divide the Indian armed forces. This was necessary not only for the security of the British lives and property in India but also for the future defence of the subcontinent from a possible Soviet threat and for their undisturbed use in an integrated system of the defence of the Commonwealth countries. //// The British also needed a secure and a peaceful ally in India so that they could continue to use her naval and air bases. This was essential for the British to maintain their lines of communication with their colonies in the Far East. The British, therefore, did their best to impress upon the Muslim League leaders that they should not demand the division of the armed forces. They argued that from the economic, military and strategic points of view it was imperative that they must have a common army and a joint defence of Hindustan and Pakistan. //// The Congress supported the move but the Muslim League firmly rejected the suggestion. Jinnah forcefully argued that if the defence of India was considered as one whole, the case of Pakistan would fall to the ground. Therefore, the Muslim League insisted on the division of the armed forces prior to Partition. It demanded an increase in the percentage of Muslim officers and men in the armed forces. The British, however, continued to side-track the issue and, even after the announcement of June 3, 1947 plan for the independence and the partition of India, Mountbatten insisted on some such arrangements or at least having a common governor-general of both Hindustan and Pakistan. //// This demand was the logical conclusion of the British insistence on keeping India a united country with its armed forces undivided within the British Commonwealth. By having British officers, a British commander-in-chief and a British governor-general, they wished to maintain an all-British chain of command for as long as possible. The Muslim League firmly rejected a united army, a permanent joint defence agreement or a common governor-general which would have practically jeopardised the sovereign status of Pakistan. The Muslim League, therefore, succeeded in its struggle to achieve an independent and sovereign state notwithstanding the British and the Congress pressure. //// The British argued that it was imperative for Hindustan and Pakistan to have a common army By early 1947, the Pakistan movement had become so strong that it could not be checkmated either by the British or the Hindus. Both of them, therefore, agreed to the division of India. But even after the acceptance the British tried to keep India united in some form. The main reason was that they did not want to divide the Indian armed forces. This was necessary not only for the security of the British lives and property in India but also for the future defence of the subcontinent from a possible Soviet threat and for their undisturbed use in an integrated system of the defence of the Commonwealth countries. //// The British also needed a secure and a peaceful ally in India so that they could continue to use her naval and air bases. This was essential for the British to maintain their lines of communication with their colonies in the Far East. The British, therefore, did their best to impress upon the Muslim League leaders that they should not demand the division of the armed forces. They argued that from the economic, military and strategic points of view it was imperative that they must have a common army and a joint defence of Hindustan and Pakistan. //// The Congress supported the move, but the Muslim League firmly rejected the suggestion. Jinnah forcefully argued that if the defence of India was considered as one whole, the case of Pakistan would fall to the ground. Therefore, the Muslim League insisted on the division of the armed forces prior to Partition. It demanded an increase in the percentage of Muslim officers and men in the armed forces.//// The British, however, continued to side-track the issue and, even after the announcement of the June 3, 1947 Plan for the Independence and Partition of India, Mountbatten insisted on some such arrangements or at least having a common governor-general of both Hindustan and Pakistan. This demand was the logical conclusion of the British insistence on keeping India a united country with its armed forces undivided within the British Commonwealth. By having British officers, British commander-in-chief and a British governor-general, they wished to maintain an all-British chain of command for as long as possible. //// The Muslim League firmly rejected a united army, a permanent joint defence agreement or a common governor-general which would have practically jeopardised the sovereign status of Pakistan. The Muslim League, therefore, succeeded in its struggle to achieve an independent and sovereign state notwithstanding the British and the Congress pressure. //// Pakistan without Calcutta would be like asking a man to live without his heart//// It remains, however, to recount in brief the events in sequel of the June 3, 1947 Plan. Mountbatten had originally envisaged the division of British India into three dominions: Hindustan, Pakistan and the free state of Bengal, each of which was to be an independent member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. //// The territories of Pakistan were to include provinces of the West Punjab, Sind and the NWFP. The state of Bengal was to have the province of Bengal and the chief commissioner's province of the Andaman and the Nicobar Islands. A united Greater Bengal was also championed by Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, the chief minister of Bengal. Jinnah and the Muslim League wanted a united Bengal as a part of their new state. "Pakistan without Calcutta would be like asking a man to live without his heart," Jinnah had argued. //// Mountbatten seems to have supported the idea of a united Bengal in order to have a united Indian army. Suhrawardy, however, emphasised upon Mountbatten to have a separate army of Bengal. Though the British seemed to have agreed in principle that the assets of India, including the armed forces, should be divided between the three states, the difficulties of creating two new armies for two Muslims successor states were immense. But since the Congress was not amenable to the idea of a united free state of Bengal, the proposal was dropped. //// Nehru accepted the division of Bengal thinking that east Bengal would be so unlivable economically that it would come back into the Indian Union within a few years. //// [Rajiv- Nehruji had his own ways of logic and thinking, and drawing conclusions without any basis of fact]//// Accordingly, the Muslim majority districts of the province of Bengal including the Chittagong Hill Tracts were separated from East Pakistan. However, a referendum in Sylhet district of Assam was agreed to and it gave its verdict in favour of Pakistan. The freedom-loving Pathans considered the British Raj to be their natural enemy and they were happy to find an ally in the Congress, the other great enemy of the Raj. After World War II, when it appeared to them that the Congress was replacing the British Raj and assuming the control of the North-West Frontier Province, the alliance could not last. //// The Muslim League slogans of "no Hindu Raj" and "Muslim unity" appealed to the Pathans. Since October, 1946, there was a definite swing of the people in favour of the Muslim League. By December 1946, the Muslim League had decided to extend its activities to the tribal areas as well. In March 1947, the Muslim League firmly planted its feet after it launched the Civil Disobedience Movement against the Congress government in the province. //// The provincial government failed to suppress the movement in spite of assistance of the police and the armed forces. The increasing influence of the Muslim League was "causing exodus of large numbers of non-Muslims" from the province. Mountbatten confirmed to the British government that due to the Muslim League campaign, the situation in the province was "very explosive." //// So far as the NWFP was concerned, the Mountbatten Plan proposed a referendum to ascertain if the province wished to join Pakistan or Hindustan. The option of Independence, as demanded by the Congress, was not agreed to by the British government for being in contravention of the June 3 Plan. Besides military authorities had felt that the NWFP, in order to withstand a possible adventure from the Soviet Union, should be under Muslim domination. The referendum, held in 2nd week of July 1947, was supervised by the British army officers of the Indian army. //// To the satisfaction of Mountbatten, Gandhi had advised Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan to remain peaceful during the elections. The results were overwhelmingly in support of Pakistan. Of the total Muslim electorates, about 60 per cent votes were cast for Pakistan. The Congress vigorously advocated the idea of "Pathanistan", but Dr Khan Sahib was reported to be willing to "co-operate and accept Pakistan if Jinnah would agree to full provincial autonomy." //// The province of Sind already had enjoyed the support of the Muslim League ministry and it voted for Pakistan. In June 1947, the British Baluchistan also decided unanimously to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly at an extraordinary session of the Shahi Jirga. //// The case of the Punjab was, however, more complicated. Under the Mountbatten Plan, the Punjab was to be partitioned like Bengal. But here, the Congress and the Sikhs demanded protection of their rights. Accordingly, a boundary commission was created to pacify the Sikhs. Jinnah and Liaquat violently protested against this to Mountbatten, but it had little effect. Thus a number of Muslim majority areas were handed over to the Indian Union. //// The decision to do so was primarily based on military and political grounds. Nehru claimed a "simpler frontier based on some natural barrier" and not one with "numerous curves and enclaves," which would create many difficulties including the question of defence. ///// Baldev Singh, the defence member, also supported Nehru on grounds of defence. Of the Muslim majority areas handed over to the Indian Union, Gurdaspur and Ferozpur were prominent. It is a matter of record that initially the salient enclosing the whole of Ferozpur and areas adjacent to Zira tehsils were included in Pakistan. But on August 10 or 11, even Jenkins, the governor of the Punjab, received a secrophone message from Viceroy House ordering action to "eliminate salient." //// As for Gurdaspur district, Justice Muhammad Munir, who was a member of the Boundary Commission, later observed about his British chairman that: 'Sir Cyril adopted a circuitous and disingenuous plan to link India with Kashmir by not drawing a line along any main physical feature but along an insignificant hill torrent having its origin in Kashmir.' //// Though Pakistan suffered in the division of the provinces and the accession of the states, the field where it was better placed came to be the armed forces//// The British did not want to annoy Nehru who wanted "a certain variation of the boundary line." It was argued that the boundaries were determined as a result of "the judgement of an eminent lawyer," who had "no conceivable axe to grind" in Indian politics. But the honourable member of the British Bar "departed from the tradition of British justice, perhaps, because the matter was not judicial but political." //// As for the Andaman and Nicobar islands, Mountbatten's initial Partition plan had given these to the proposed free state of Bengal. But since June 3 Plan had given East Bengal to Pakistan, Jinnah laid a claim to these islands. He argued that the islands were never a part of India and the population consisted of tribes who were not connected with the people of Indian by ethnic, cultural or religious ties. //// He pointed out that the only channel of communication between East and West Pakistan was by sea and these islands occupied a strategic position on that route and provided refueling bases. Jinnah also desired to discuss the future of these islands before August 15, from a defence point of view. The viceroy was, however, advised against negotiations with the Indian leaders on defence matters before that date. Naturally, this strategy led to the handing over the islands to India. //// The problem of the princely states was even more complicated. The Mountbatten Plan had envisaged that the withdrawal of the British could mean giving a free choice to the states to remain independent or join with either of the successor dominions. Mountbatten, however, saw to it that none of the states would exercise its choice for Independence. It was his policy that they must join one of the two dominions according to their geographical position, conceding at least defence, foreign affairs and communication to the central authority. //// The secretary of state for India also advised him that "it was out of question for Britain to do anything to encourage states to stand out completely." The Congress leaders has also asked Mountbatten not to do anything to encourage the states to declare their independence. It appears that the United States had exercised its influence on Britain not to grant independence to the states. Though the British wanted the states to accede to one of the dominions, it appears that, in case of a tie, the government's preference was for India. //// The reason, in the words of Mountbatten, was that the Indian Union "consisting nearly three-fourth of India and with its immense resources and its important strategic position in the Indian Ocean" could not be estranged. Naturally, he was found to be "working hard" on the representatives of certain major states to accede to India. //// From the viewpoint of Pakistan, the accession of the states of Hyderabad and Kashmir are more significant. The Hyderabad state was about the size of England and Scotland put together, with a population of 17 million and a regular army. It was a land-locked state and was in need of a seaport. On July 1, 1947, Hyderabad issued a farman that after the departure of the British, the state would be independent. //// Mountbatten and W T Monkton, the British adviser to the government of Hyderabad, tried their best "in a coordinated plan of campaign," to bring the Nizam to accede to India. Jinnah warned Mountbatten that in case the Congress attempted to exert any pressure on Hyderabad, the hundred million Muslims would "rise as one man to defend the oldest Muslim dynasty in India." //// Mountbatten, however, hoped that the "Nizam need not fear any armed intervention" and the Congress would be able to disrupt the dynasty from within. The facts proved otherwise. The Congress was unable to wreck the dynasty from within and Hyderabad had to suffer the onslaught of an Indian military intervention immediately after Jinnah's death in September 1948. //// The state of Jammu and Kashmir is a typical example where all other dictates were sacrificed at the altar of strategic interests of India. From the geographical, historical, demographic, economic and geopolitical points of view, Kashmir should have acceded to Pakistan. But Mountbatten had been emphasising upon certain states, including Kashmir to join the Indian Union because of their geographical location. //// As early as June 1947, Nehru had formally asked Mountbatten that though Muslims formed 77.11% of the population in the Jammu and Kashmir state, it should go to India. The foremost reason for his demand was that the state was "of the first importance to India as a whole... because of the great strategic importance of that frontier state." Jinnah publicly indicated that wisdom demanded that the ruler of Kashmir would not ignore, much less hurt, "feelings and sentiments of the Muslims" who formed 80% of the population. //// [Rajiv- Off course, Mr. Jinnah was naturally trying to work the interest of Pakistan.]//// But, in the end, the Mountbatten-Nehru collusion succeeded in bringing the ruler of Kashmir into declaring accession to India. //// [Rajiv- This is not true as Maharaja Hari Singh had requested Nehruji to do this accession five months earlier and Nehru had declined.] //// Thus the fate of four million people, more than three quarters Muslim, was settled not by the popular wish but by the whims of one man, with the active encouragement and support of the last viceroy of the British Crown. //// Though Pakistan suffered in the division of the provinces and the accession of the states, the field where it was better placed came to be the armed forces. Although the population of Pakistan was about 25% of the Indian subcontinent, its share of the armed forces was about 33%. But the Pakistan army had an initial setback that its forces were neither organised nor all of them available in Pakistan. In fact, Lieutenant General Frank W Messervy, British GOC-in-C of the Northern Command, replied to the viceroy, that out of 67 battalions available in West Pakistan, only 35 would be left there. //// Even these were to be at half strength owing to the movement of Hindu and Sikh companies. No Muslim companies were available in Pakistan for any replacement. This was precisely one of the reasons that the Pakistan army could not be used in Kashmir in October 1947 against the Indian military intervention. Later, when the Pakistan army was a little better organised it prevented the Indian forces from occupying the entire state of Kashmir and forced India to seek a cease-fire. //// [RAjiv- This is false, this happened due to Nehruji having a nervous break down, talking about UNSC, Peace, diplomacy, etc. and not allowing Indian generals to proceed]. //// But since the basic tensions remained unresolved, it was natural for the two armed forces to clash, as they did in the 1965 and 1971. And even thereafter the historical, geo-political and strategic compulsions cannot be overlooked as they would continue to determine the course of history in times to come. //// [Rajiv- BAsic problem was that a person thinks based on their training. Pakistan's strength was mostly military and they had problems in lack of agriculture land and lots of other things. So the easy path was to take on India militarily. But keeping military costs money. Then slowly it becomes a vicious circle.] //// THE END RESULT WAS THAT ISLAMIC BULLIES INFLICTED A CRUSHING DEFEAT ON SECULAR INDIA, REDUCED IT BY ONE THIRD, WIPED OUT INDIA'S IMAGE IN THE WORLD, EVEN TINY TIN POT COUNTRIES LIKE UGANDA AND FIJI COULD KICK THE INDIANS OUT, AND THE HINDUS BECAME "DOGS AND DONKEYS" EVEN IN SOUTH KASHMIR.//// THE RESULT WAS THAT THE MUSLIMS SAW A POWER VACUUM IN SOUTH ASIA AND COULD CREATE AN OBSCENE ISLAMIC COUNTRY IN THE MIDDLE OF 20TH CENTURY AND TWO YEARS AFTER THE END OF WORLD WAR 2 THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO END ALL TOTALITARIANISM. BU COLLAPSING SO QUICKLY BEFORE THE ISLAMIC MONSTER, INDIA IS NOW FACING ANOTHER CIVIL WAR THAT WILL CLAIM THE LIVES OF MILLIONS OF HINDUS. THE HINDUS HAD TO EXPEL OR EXTERMINATE THE MUSLIMS AFTER CONCEDING THEM PAKISTAN UPON THEIR KNNES. GOD'S COMMAND THAT THE WEAK DESERVE TO PERISH WILL COME TRUE SINCE THE HINDU BACKBONE OF DEFENCE BROKE IN 1947 AND THE HINDU LEADERS COULD NOT REPAIR IT EVEN IN THE LAST SIX DECADES. THE BRAINWASHED AND TERRIFIED HINDUS DO NOT SPEAK OF PARTITION BUT CALL IT INDEPENDENCE AND SING AND DANCE LIKE MONKEYS CELEBRATING THE BRAVERY OF FUNK AND COWARD MAHATMA GANDHI AND TRAITOR JAWAHARLAL NEHRU.//// ....000000000

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